The complete subtree (CS) method is one of the most well-known broadcast encryptions which do not enforce the receivers to keep "online." This paper is to reduce the size of secret information which must be stored in a terminal of the method. In the original CS method, the size of the secret information increases as the number of terminals increases. It is shown in this paper that, by making use of a one-way trapdoor permutation, we can make the size constant regardless of the number of terminals. The security of the proposed scheme is investigated, and detailed comparison with other similar schemes is presented. The proposed scheme is suitable for practical implementations of the CS method. key words: key management, broadcast encryption, complete subtree method, stateless receivers, trapdoor permutations, random oracle model
Introduction
Recent development of the Internet and highspeed communication channel enable commercial-based distribution of digital contents such as the cable TV and the satellite broadcasting. In these kinds of services, we must assume that there exist malicious users who do not pay proper charge, or try to eavesdrop the digital contents. Thus, the revocation mechanism which enforces the malicious users not to use the digital contents is needed. A typical solution using cryptography for revocation mechanism is a broadcast encryption [6] .
In the broadcast encryption, the trusted center (or simply center) assigns different secret information to each terminal beforehand. When the center wants to deliver the digital contents to the specific group of terminals which seems valid, the center encrypts the contents using the secret information so that only the valid users can decrypt it. In the simple broadcast encryptions such as [15] , [16] , a terminal needs to update its internal secret information every time a user revocation event occurs. That is to say, users need to keep their terminals always connectable from the center so that they can receive the updated information. This enforcement sometimes becomes serious in some services such as the DVD player which is usually an offline terminal. One solution for this kind of problem is to send the revocation information together with the digital contents [1] - [3] , [7] - [14] . To evaluate these kinds of methods, we must consider (1) the size of secret information stored in the terminal, (2) a) E-mail: ryo-no@is.naist.jp the additional information which contains revocation information sent together with the encrypted contents, and (3) the computational complexity needed at each terminal to decrypt the encrypted contents. It seems that there is some kind of tradeoff among (1), (2) , and (3). In [11] two basic methods, the complete subtree (CS) method and the subset difference (SD) method are presented. In the CS method the size of the additional information (in the sense of (2) above) is large but secret information in the receiver is small. On the other hand, in the SD method, the secret information and the time complexity are large but the additional information becomes small. Since the time complexity and the storage size are large in the SD method, the CS method, or a hybrid method which combines the CS method with the SD method, seems to be practical, since it is often the case that there is some restriction of the computational power or storage size on the users' terminals (consider, for instance, the case that mobile phones are used as terminals). In fact the size of the secret information in a terminal is O(log N) where N is the number of terminals, and it increases logarithmically to N. In the case N is huge, the size of the secret information can be problematic. In this paper, a new key management scheme for the CS method is proposed. The proposed scheme utilizes a one-way trapdoor permutation, and the size of the secret information which is stored in a terminal is reduced to just one key, regardless of the number of terminals. There are some research results which have the same purpose as this paper. For example, Asano proposes a key management scheme by making use of the master-key cryptography [1] , and the authors have proposed a scheme which uses a pair of strongly semi-claw-free permutations [12] , [13] in the CS method. Compared to these similar research results, the scheme considered in this paper has advantages. For example, the computation needed at a terminal is quite simple in the proposed scheme. These properties make the proposed scheme especially suitable for implementing the practical digital contents service.
We briefly review the CS method in Sect. 2, and propose a key management scheme in Sect. 3. The security issue of the scheme is also discussed in Sect. 3. It is shown that the proposed scheme satisfies a key-intractability, which is an important property in a broadcast encryption, under the random oracle model [4] . In Sect. 4, we compare the proposed scheme with other key management schemes, and discuss the advantage of the proposed scheme. In a complete subtree (CS) method [11] , a trusted center (or simply center) uses a tree structure to manage the set of keys which are distributed to users' equipments (terminals). Let U be the set of all terminals, and assume for simplicity that U contains 2 t terminals with t a positive integer. The center first constructs a complete binary tree T (with height t), and associates each terminal with a leaf of T . We write n ∈ T to mean that n is a node of T , and write n 1 ≺ n 2 if n 1 ∈ T is an ancestor of n 2 ∈ T . The center assigns keys of a symmetric key cryptosystem to nodes of T so that each node has a unique key. We write k(n) to represent the key which was assigned to n ∈ T , and p(n) to represent the parent node of n ∈ T . The center embeds a set of keys {k(n)|n ∈ T, n ≺ l} to a terminal which corresponds to the leaf l. The center also provides the terminal with the address of the terminal so that the terminal can realize which position in the tree T the terminal locates. It is assumed that the information provided from the center is stored in a tamper-proof part of the terminal. Nobody else except an appropriate part of the terminal can retrieve the stored information.
Consider the case that the center would like to deliver digital contents c to a subset U ⊆ U of terminals. Here R = U \ U is the set of revoked terminals. In this case, the center randomly choose a key r of a symmetric key cryptosystem, and broadcast E(r, c) which is an encryption of c using the key r. To allow terminals in U to obtain r, the center also distributes some additional information which is determined as follows.
1. Calculate T (R) = {n|n ∈ T, ∃l ∈ R, n ≺ l}. T (R) is the set of all ancestors of leaves in R.
That is, P(R) is the set of all nodes whose parent nodes belong to T (R), but the nodes themselves do not belong to T (R).
Calculate K(R) = { the address of n, E(k(n), r) | n ∈ P(R)} and distribute all elements in K(R).
Since each terminal is provided with keys of its ancestor nodes, k(n) with n ∈ T (R) is embedded in at least one revoked terminal, and k(n) with n ∈ P(R) is not embedded in any revoked terminal. Also remark that each valid terminal in U has exactly one ancestor in P(R). Therefore, every valid terminal can obtain r by finding and decrypting an appropriate pair in K(R), while no revoked terminal can obtain r. Figure 1 shows an example of a terminal revocation, where n i (1 ≤ i ≤ 7) and l j (1 ≤ j ≤ 8) are nodes. The keys {k(n 1 ), k(n 3 ), k(n 7 ), k(l 7 )} have been given to the terminal l 7 beforehand. When the revoked terminals are {l 3 , l 5 , l 6 } (the black nodes in the figure), the set of all ancestors of the revoked terminals is T (R) = {n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 5 , n 6 , l 3 , l 5 , l 6 }. In this case, P(R) = {n 4 , n 7 , l 4 }, and the keys for the calculation of K(R) become {k(n 4 ), k(n 7 ), k(l 4 )}. This time, terminal l 7 carries out the decryption using k(n 7 ). As for the CS method, the following problems have been pointed out.
1. The problem of the message overhead: it is necessary to broadcast |P(R)| encryptions of r. Analysis in [11] shows that |P(R)| is |R| log N/|R| in average, and grows too rapidly in |R|, where N = |U|. 2. The problem of the secret size in a terminal: Each terminal needs to store log N + 1(= t + 1) keys. Generally, the cost for storing information secretly is not small. If N is big, then the cost of each terminal increases.
This paper is to solve the problem 2 above. To reduce the secret size in a terminal, we propose a scheme which applies a trapdoor permutation to assign a key to each node in T .
Proposed Scheme and Its Security

The Proposed Scheme
The center chooses a one-way trapdoor permutation f :
λ where λ is a security parameter, and assigns each node n of the tree with a label L n ∈ {0, 1} λ . The permutation f and the labels of nodes are opened to public, but the trapdoor information of f is kept secret by the center. Meanwhile, we assume that labels of nodes are defined by a hash function h : {n|n ∈ T } → {0, 1}
λ , and h is modeled as a random oracle [4] . (Using the random oracle model makes discussion easier, but it might be too conservative to use the random oracle model here. The authors conjectured that we can relax this random oracle model to standard model, but it will be our future work). That is, the label of node n is defined as L n = h(n). We may call h a labeling function. By defining the labels by the hash function h and by publicizing h, anybody can compute the label of an arbitrary node.
According to the following rule, the center computes the keys of nodes in the tree.
• The key which is assigned to the root node is randomly chosen from the set {0, 1} λ .
• If the key of a node n is k(n), then the key of its child n is defined as
where L n is the label of n .
By using the above rule, the center can determine the keys of nodes uniquely. The center delivers the key k(l) to the terminal which corresponds to a leaf l. Thus, the information which must be kept securely by a terminal is just k(l). Each terminal additionally needs to remember f and h, but these functions are not secret information. Remark that if a terminal knows the key k(n ), then the terminal can compute the key k(n) of the parent node n of n as
since f and h are known to the public. By applying the above equations iteratively, a terminal which corresponds to a leaf l can compute the key k(n) for any n ≺ l. Figure 2 shows an example of the key assignment. The terminal at the leaf l 3 receives f
from the center beforehand. When the center distributes digital contents, the keys defined as above are used in the same way as the CS method.
Security of the Proposed Scheme
The authors consider that there are two different "levels" concerning the security of a tree-based key management system. The more secure one is the key-indistinguishability considered in [11] , in which, intuitively, a polynomial-time adversary cannot distinguish k(n) from a random sequence if n is not an ancestor of the adversary. Another level of the security is key-intractability, in which a polynomial-time adversary cannot compute k(n) if n is not an ancestor of the adversary. Remark that the key-indistinguishability is a stronger property than the key-intractability. Indeed, an adversary who can compute k(n) will easily distinguish k(n) from a random sequence.
Unfortunately, the scheme proposed in the previous section does not have the property of the keyindistinguishability. For example, assume that an adversary who corresponds to a leaf l is given a sequence x ∈ {0, 1} λ , and asked if x = k(n) where n ⊀ l. The adversary can compute the key of the root node, say k(r), by using his/her own key k(l). On the other hand, the adversary can "simulate" the computation of keys of ancestors of n assuming that k(n) = x. If the root key obtained by this simulation coincides with k(r), then the assumption k(n) = x was correct. Thus the adversary can distinguish k(n) and a random sequence.
In the rest of this section, it is shown that the scheme considered in the previous section satisfies the key-intractability. The security, in the sense of the keyintractability, of the proposed scheme depends on the onewayness of the permutation f . A terminal can easily compute the keys of its ancestors, but it cannot compute the keys of non-ancestor nodes without knowing the trapdoor information of f . To prove this property formally, we first review the definition of one-way trapdoor permutations.
Definition 1 (one-way trapdoor permutation [5] ): For a collection of permutations
* , assume the followings:
1. There is an efficient sampling algorithm TD-Gen(1 λ ) which outputs a random index i ∈ {0, 1} * ∩ I and a trapdoor information TK. 2. There is an efficient sampling algorithm which, on input i, outputs a random x ∈ D i . We write x ← D i as a shorthand for running this algorithm. 
A is said to (t(λ), (λ))-break F if A runs in time at most t(λ) and Adv ow A,F (λ) ≥ (λ). F is said to be (t(λ), (λ))-secure if no adversary A can (t(λ), (λ))-break it.
In asymptotic setting, we require that the advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time A is negligible in λ. Put differently, f i is hard to invert without the trapdoor TK. ∆
To discuss the key-intractability, let definē
|l is a leaf node with n ⊀ l} for a node n of the tree.K(n) is the set of pairs of an address and a key of a leaf which is not a descendent of the node n. FromK(n) and public information such as f and h, one can compute the key of a node n unless n is a descendent of n. The key-intractability is a property such that even if we give the adversary the setK(n), the adversary cannot compute the key k(n). This models the scenario such that k(n) is used as a key to encrypt r (r is the key to encrypt the contents), and all users except those descendents of n collude to reveal k(n). To formalize this property, we consider an adversary as a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B 2 ) . B 1 , the first part of the algorithm outputs a node n (target node) and an internal state s which might be helpful for B 2 . B 2 receivesK(n) and the internal state s, and tries to find k(n). If the success probability of B is negligible, then the key management system is key-intractable.
In the following discussion, we assume that the number of terminals is in a polynomial-order to the security parameter. This means that there exists a polynomial w and N = w(λ).
Definition 2:
Consider a tree-based key management scheme which manages w(λ) terminals. Let f : {0, 1} λ → {0, 1}
λ be a (one-way trapdoor) permutation and h :
λ be a labeling function which are chosen randomly from the appropriate collections, say F and H, respectively. For an adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) who attacks the tree-based key management scheme, define
.
We say that the key management system has the keyintractability with F and H if Adv Notice that this definition of the key-intractability is derived analogously to the Definition 7 of [11] which defines the "key-indistinguishability." In the next lemma, we prove that our proposed scheme has key-intractability.
Lemma 1: If f : {0, 1}
λ → {0, 1} λ is randomly chosen from a collection of one-way trapdoor permutations and h : {n 1 , . . . , n 2w(λ)−1 } → {0, 1} λ is randomly chosen from the random oracles then the proposed scheme has the keyintractability. Proof: The proof is by contraposition. We construct a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A which inverts a given (randomly and uniformly chosen) value c by making use of an adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) attacking the proposed scheme in the sense of the key-intractability. A needs to provide the labeling function h and some keys, and h can regarded as an oracle for the viewpoint of B. Thus we write B
The following is the construction of A.
1. Build a binary tree T which has 2w(λ) − 1 nodes. 2. Determine one target node n c ∈ {n 1 , . . . , n 2w(λ)−1 } randomly, and define R be the set of leaves which are not descendents of n c . 3. The labeling function and keys are determined so that keys and labels satisfy the relation (1), and the parent of n c has c ⊕ L n c as a key. Remark that if the parent of n c has c ⊕ L n c as a key, then k(n c ) = f −1 (c). For this sake, a label L n (the value of h(n)) is determined for each node n ∈ T , and a key k(n) is determined for each node n with n c ⊀ n. The computation is performed in a bottom-up manner using the following rule.
• For each node n with n c ≺ n, let L n = h(n) be a randomly chosen value.
• For each leaf n ∈ R, let k(n) be a randomly chosen value.
• If n i and n j are sibling nodes in T and both of k(n i ) and k(n j ) have been determined, then choose L n i and L n j randomly but to satisfy
Furthermore, let the key of the parent of n i and
• If n i and n c are sibling nodes in T (remark that n c is the designated target node chosen in the step 2) and k(n i ) has been determined, then choose L n i to satisfy f (k(n i ))⊕L n i = c⊕L n c . Furthermore, let the key of the parent of n i and n c be f
• The label of the root node is determined randomly.
The above construction defines pairs n, L n for every node n in the tree. The pairs are hold by A and used to answer to queries (on h) from B. Remark that since the keys of leaf nodes are chosen uniformly, labels also distribute uniformly. Note that if B 1 did not choose the target node n c in the step 4, then A has few chance to find f −1 (c). For example, if n ⊀ n c , thenK(n) includes the keys of descendants of n c but A cannot compute such keys. If n ≺ n c and n n c , on the other hand, then A can constructK(n) but the result x returned from B 2 in the step 6 is rather "obvious information" for A which does not help computing f −1 (c). Therefore, A has chance to compute f −1 (c) only if B 1 chooses n = n c , this happens with probability 1 2w(λ)−1 , and therefore
We regard the number of users as polynomial in the security parameter. Thus, Adv Since the reduction cost in the above security proof is not so efficient, tighter proof is needed to make the proposal more practical.
Comparison with Other Schemes
This section is to compare the proposed scheme with other schemes for the key management in the complete-subtree (CS) method [11] . We consider the naive scheme originally considered in [11] (we call the scheme an "original scheme" in the following) and the master-key based key-management scheme considered in [1] . In [1] , the master-key based scheme is discussed with a general a-ary tree with a > 1. The scheme considered in this paper can be extended to the a-ary tree easily, though, we consider the case with a = 2 to make the comparison clearer. In this case, the "Method 2" in [1] is essentially the same as the CS method, and we refer the "Method 1" in [1] as just a master-key scheme. The first point for the comparison is the size of the "critical" information which must be kept secretly in a terminal. Generally speaking, the cost for store information secretly is very expensive. It is strongly desired that the amount of critical information is as small as possible. In the original scheme, each terminal needs to remember the keys of its ancestor nodes, and the keys must be kept secretly. Each key is rather short since it is used as a key of a symmetric cryptosystem, but a terminal needs to hold log N + 1 keys where N is the total number of terminals. Thus the size of the critical information is O(log N). In the masterkey scheme, a terminal holds just one master-key. Though the master-key is usually longer than a key for symmetric cryptosystems, the length of the key can be regarded as a constant. The size of the critical information is therefore O(1) in the master-key scheme. With a similar discussion, the size of the critical information in the proposed scheme is O (1) . In the proposed and master-key schemes, the size of the critical information is independent from the number of terminals. This property is especially favorable when the number of terminals is very large.
The next point for the comparison is the size of the "non-critical" information which must be kept by a terminal but not securely. The cost for storing non-critical information is not so large since it can be recorded in a usual ROM, and the size of non-critical information is not as significant issue as that of critical information. However, it will be problematic if the size of non-critical information increases as the number of terminals increases. In the original scheme, there is no non-critical information since all the necessary information is hold by a terminal as "critical" keys. In the master-key scheme, a terminal needs to refer prime numbers which are associated to nodes of a tree. Instead of storing the prime numbers in a terminal directly, Asano proposes to compute them in an on-the-fly manner [1] . In this case, the non-critical information will be the description of the onthe-fly computation. In the scheme proposed in this paper, each terminal need to have the one-way trapdoor permutation f and the labeling function h. Therefore the non-critical information in the proposed scheme is the descriptions of f and h. In general, it is difficult to estimate the size of descriptions of f , h and the "on-the-fly computation" in the master-key scheme, though, it seems natural to consider that the descriptions are in constant order to the number of terminals. Therefore, we can say that, in the master-key and the proposed schemes, the size of non-critical information is unfortunately increased for the expense to decrease the critical information, but the increase is minimum in the sense that it is independent from the number of terminals.
Next we consider the amount of computation needed in a terminal to derive the key r which is used to encrypt the contents. No computation is necessary in the original scheme because possible keys are directly stored in a terminal. In the master-key scheme, a terminal needs to generate prime numbers, multiply them and compute one modular exponentiation. The dominant phase in this computation is the prime number generation, whose complexity is O((log N) 5 ) [1] . As for the proposed scheme, a terminal need to compute the permutation f and the labeling function h at most log N times each. The actual complexity is thus depends on the choice of f and h, but we can say that it is O(log N). Table 1 summarizes the above comparison. We can see that the master-key scheme and the proposed scheme require terminals to hold small amount of critical information. Though terminals need to store non-critical information in these schemes, the size of non-critical information is independent from the number of terminals, and therefore the additional burden to terminals is minimum. Indeed, the cost for storing non-critical information would be much smaller than that for critical information, and this will not be problematic. The proposed scheme has an advantage against the master-key scheme in the computational complexity issue: It requires a terminal to perform O(log N) computation, while O((log N) 5 ) computation is needed in the master-key scheme. On the other hand, the security of the proposed scheme is shown in the random oracle model. This might be a disadvantage to the master-key scheme.
Concluding Remarks
A tree-based key management scheme is proposed, and its security is discussed. The proposed scheme minimizes the size of critical information kept in terminals with minimal increasement of non-critical information. This property makes the scheme highly suitable in the implementation. Recently, Ogata et al. have independently proposed a tree-based key management scheme in [14] . To the authors' understanding, the scheme in [14] is quite similar to the proposed scheme such that the trapdoor permutation is the RSA function and the addresses of nodes are regarded as labels. [14] gives detailed discussion with this setting, and their results suggest us interesting directions on the choice of cryptographic components in our scheme. their constructive comments.
